



Malware Retooled

Moving away from purpose built platforms (Zeus, SpyEye) to general tools (Sunspot) to target specific industries.

Hacker | Halted

www.hackerhalted.com

Agenda - General

- Revisited – Old Malware
 - Zeus, SpyEye, etc
- Retooled – New Malware
 - Sunspot aka Ambler/NetHell
- Malware Analysis – what malware looks like
- Clustering and Visualization
- Q & A

Crime Packs vs. Malware

Starts here -
You're the Manager

- Offered through black market
- Feeds malware business
- Exploit packs, botnet

Ends here –
PWNED

- Fake AV, Malicious PDF's or attachments, Hacked Websites, Social Media outlets allow the bad guys to get in.



Revisited - Malware

Zeus & SpyEye

– Behavior


- Trojan
- Banking

– Infection Point

- Web Browser

– Origin

- Crime Packs
(CrimeWare)



Malware Behavior Traits


Common To Both

DLL Hooking/Injection

Disable AV/Firewall

*Dynamic Process – (random
file names)*

*AutoRun –
(registry mod)*



SpyEye

Function Hashing

Custom Obfuscation

Plugin Driven

Kill Zeus

Kill AV

Zeus

Packer

Later

Vista/7 aware

Support for FireFox

Zeus Code - Exposed

Zeus Killer code This is the C++ source code for the Zeus Killer #include <windows.h> #pragma warning(disable : 4005) // macro redefinition #include <ntdll.h> #pragma warning(default : 4005) #include <shlwapi.h> #include <shlobj.h> void GetZeusInfo(ULONG dwArg, PCHAR lpOut, DWORD dwOutLn, PCHAR lpOutLn, HANDLE hProcess, HANDLE hThread, HANDLE hFile, NTSTATUS Status = 0; ULONG len = 0x2000; PCHAR lpOutLn = 0; HANDLE proc = 0, thandle = 0, hFile = 0; BOOLEAN enable = FALSE; UCHAR nhttp://www.opensc.ws/trojan-malware-samples/9634-c-zeus-killer-source.htmlame[300] = {0}; ULONG temp = 0, rw = 0; do http://www.opensc.ws/trojan-malware-samples/9634-c-zeus-killer-source.html



State of AV Industry


IIKARUS Security- GmbH

Retooled Malware

Sunspot (Limbo , Ambler)

- HTML Injection
- 7 aware (App Dir)
- Dynamic Process
- Steals Data





What does
this
mean?

Money



Zeus &
SpyEye

Bugat

Sunspot,
NetHell &
Lymbo

RE: crime Pack I can sell crime pack to you msn – FakeName@hotmail.com

Crime Packs are Affordable

Entry Fees

- » Windows7/Vista compatibility module – \$2,000
- » Backconnect module – \$1,500
- » Firefox form grabbing – \$2,000
- » Jabber notification – \$500
- » FTP clients saved credentials grabbing module – \$2,000
- » VNC module — \$10,000
(reportedly no longer being sold/supported)

Krebs on Security - www.krebsonsecurity.com



Malware is Money Motivated

“Rapidly growing organized criminal groups have become more specialized in financial fraud and have been successful in compromising an increasing array of controls” *Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council*

Nearly \$70m in sales –
from rogue pill buys!


The figures shown below come from sales data stolen from
Glavmed, a Russian affiliate program from 2006-2010

Krebs on Security - www.krebsonsecurity.com

Bank	Amount	# of Orders	% of Total
Bank of America	\$10,710,611	90,529	15
Chase	\$10,508,271	88,705	14.7
Citibank	\$4,717,992	39,329	6.5
Wells Fargo	\$3,861,419	35,200	5.8
Capital One	\$3,819,638	32,914	5.5
HSBC	\$1,925,561	17,492	2.9
U.S. Bank	\$1,711,017	14,796	2.5
Barclays Bank	\$1,600,863	14,104	2.3

Malware Trend

Total number of unique samples included in
AV-Test's malware repository (1984-2010)






Profiles of Contemporary Threats

Threat Type	What it does...	How money is made
Rogue Software	False Scanning Service and discovery of threats and/or problems	Payment for “fake” security software.
Bots and Botnets	Send/Relay Spam DDoS Attacks	\$\$/spam Bot Army rental
Phishing and Scams	Captures Personal/Financial information	Directly stealing using financial info gathered
Ransomware	Encrypts critical files (docs, etc), and only provide decryption key when ransom is settled	Ransom payment from victimized users.

The background of the slide features a detailed, grayscale pattern of a circuit board or microchip. The pattern consists of numerous fine lines, traces, and geometric shapes, creating a complex, technical appearance. The lines are more prominent on the left and right sides, fading towards the center where the text is located.

Clustering & Classification


Clustering and Visualisation



- *Extraction of prototypes.* From a given set of reports, identify a subset of prototypes representative for the full data set. The prototypes provide a quick overview of recorded behavior and can be used to guide manual inspection.
- *Clustering of behavior.* Identify groups (clusters) of reports containing similar behavior. Clustering allows for discovering novel classes of malware and provides the basis for crafting specific detection and defense mechanisms
- *Classification of behavior.* Based on a set of previously clustered reports, assign unknown behavior to known groups of malware. Classification enables identifying novel variants of malware and can be used to filter program behavior prior to manual inspection


Ref. <http://www.mlsec.org/malheur/>

ThreadGraphs



Malicious PDF

Treemap



Visualization



Clustering and Visualisation – so what?

Criteria to create a cluster:

- Commonality of:
 - Mutex creation
 - Registry changes
 - Network traffic
 - Other...

Clustering gives us:

- Identify new malware by old authors
- Quickly, automatically identify new malware families
- Verify if new malware constitutes a new technique or threat, or merely a repackaging of an old threat

Old Malware Retooled to New Malware

More Malware Authors

- Old malware is new malware :
 - Malware Authors are getting sophisticated
- Latest threats:
 - Old malware code – new behavior

What's in the wild today can easily change tomorrow!



Q & A